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ABSTRACT In this paper we investigate the ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) thesis, focusing on
explanations and interpretations of OIC, with a view to clarifying its uses and relevance to
legal philosophy. We first review various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of
OIC; then we consider how OIC may be incorporated in Hartian and Kelsenian theories of
the law. Along the way we also propose a taxonomy of OIC-related claims.
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:. Introduction
In this paper, we review some of the various logical and pragmatic interpretations of
‘ought implies can’ (OIC), and then explore the ways in which OIC might be interpreted
in the context of legal philosophy, in particular the theories of Hans Kelsen and Herbert
Hart. The aim is fairly modest: we do not seek to make specific proposals about how to
interpret the OIC thesis in a legal context, or defend any particular perspective; rather
we seek to map out some of the space of possibilities, and provide a framework to guide
further investigation and exploration of this area.
The principle of OIC is intended to express the idea that if there is an obligation,
then it should be possible to fulfil that obligation. Any appraisal of OIC is destined to
provoke questions concerning the nature of obligations, the interpretation of ‘can’, and
the kind of implication intended. Under what circumstances does the statement of an
obligation create an obligation? Does ‘can’ here mean alethic possibility, physical ability,
or something else? Is ‘can’ to be interpreted as holding in all relevant circumstances, or
only some? Is the implication to be interpreted logically, or pragmatically? Related to
this, what is the status of an unfulfillable obligation? Is it an attempt to assert something
that is false, or infelicitous? How are we to interpret ‘can’ in the context of an obligation
that is fulfillable in some circumstances, but not others?
Answers to these questions are not easy; not only is there a large space of potential
interpretations of OIC, any rigorous analysis may involve appeal to other contentious
areas—such as the interpretation of counter-factuals, or the principle of alternative
possibilities (Feis 20:4)—where there is, arguably, no settled analysis.
These questions about OIC do not arise out of mere sterile curiosity. When it comes
to the law, the issue of ‘reasonableness’, both in its formulation and its application,
may be a material factor. And a fundamental question that arises when considering
‘reasonableness’ is whether or not the law effectively imposes obligations, or creates an
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expectation, that cannot be satisfied, either individually or jointly—even if OIC itself is
not always directly ‘determinative’ (cf. Hart :96:, :75).
While there are a range of philosophical theories about the law, and descriptive and
normative principles about its drafting and application, as far as we are aware, there has
been little if any work that explores the space of possible interpretations of OIC in the
context of these theories.
In the case of legal obligations, intuitively it would seem perverse to impose an
obligation-to-do that it were not feasible to satisfy (cf. Carter 200:; Forrester :989;
Lawford-Smith 20:2; Tranøy :972, :975). It would also appear perverse to impose
an obligation that was in conflict with another legal obligation—at least not without
there being some mechanism for resolving such conflicts. The standard of feasibility
appears to be one that takes such conflicts into consideration (cf. Gilabert 2009; Lawford-
Smith 20:0). In that sense, OIC applies only to those drafting laws, or contracts, or
issuing commands. OIC may be viewed as a condition relating to the rationality or
reasonableness of the norm-giver. If an obligation requires the impossible, the authority
issuing it can be accused of being irrational or unreasonable, but by itself that does not
necessarily preclude the impossible from still being considered an obligation.:
As this interpretation of OIC relates to assumptions about the motives of the drafters
of a legal text, it may be appropriate to consider OIC to be a pragmatic implicature. But
in this context there is a difference: it would appear that the wider legal system should
seek to ensure that laws are interpreted or clarified in a way that seeks to sustain this
‘implicature’ and avoid a cancellable, or defeasible, interpretation. That is not to say
that OIC is in and off itself to be interpreted as an indefeasible implicature; rather it is
that OIC seems to capture a higher-level obligation or principle that the law should be
drafted, interpreted, or reformulated in a way that, as far as possible, the obligations that
are deemed to be imposed, both on those subject to the law and those implementing
it, are in principle achievable, thereby minimising or eliminating the occurrence of
impossible obligations.
In this paper we present various strands of the OIC thesis. The remainder of the
paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives some background, including logical and
pragmatic accounts of OIC and the kind of norm that OIC might be. A taxonomy of
OIC theses is also proposed. Section 3 discusses OIC and legal philosophy, with a focus
on the theories of Hart and Kelsen. Section 4 concludes.
2. Background
Here we give a brief history of the OIC thesis; discuss various kinds of norms—speculating
as to what kind of norm OIC might be; review some semantic and pragmatic interpreta-
tions of OIC; and propose a taxonomy of OIC theses.
:On impossible obligations see Feldman (200:), Martin (2009), Jay (20:3), and Kühler (20:2); Feis (20:5,
ch. 2, especially pp. 48–50), and Tessman (20:5, esp. ch. :–3). One case where impossible obligations
appear to be ruled out is Justinian Digesta, as it features Celsus’ impossibilium nulla obligatio: what is
impossible carries no obligation (see D.50.:7.:85).
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2.:. A brief sketch of OIC’s history
OIC is an old thesis, but it has remained live and relevant. Even when it was considered
dogma, it was often invoked, although sometimes questioned—perhaps increasingly so
in recent times. The principle is commonly ascribed to Kant (see Stern [2004] for the
issues involved in this conception) but goes back at least to Celsus and the Justinian
Digesta (D.50.:7.:85) under the formulation inpossibilium nulla obligatio. According to
Blum (2000) the thesis can be found also in Pelagius and Augustine. (On the genesis
of OIC see Baumgardt [:946].) It is appropriate to quote Howard-Snyder’s (2006, 223)
remarks on the status of OIC, and the attacks against it:
Twenty years ago such an argument [against OIC] would have seemed pointless – since the
principle was then regarded as more or less axiomatic – a premise rather than a conclusion.
In the last few years, however, OIC has come under sustained attack from several quarters.
In modern times (e.g., from Moore [:922] onwards) the thesis of OIC has often
been considered to be ‘intuitively’ true. A version of it also taken to be an axiom in
some forms of deontic logic (see §2.2.:). But there has been the occasional criticism of
OIC (e.g. Lemmon :965; Stocker :97:; Dahl :974), with some further strong criticisms
appearing more recently (Saka 2000; Ryan 2003; Martin 2009).2
2.2. Semantic and pragmatic OIC: kinds of inference
When considering possible relationships between ‘Ought p’ and ‘Can p’, there are a
number of candidates in the literature, including whether ‘Can p’ is an entailment, a
presupposition, or an implicature of ‘Ought p’.
2.2.:. Entailments and axioms: OIC in von Wright’s deontic logic
Formal logics by themselves cannot directly answer philosophical questions such as
whether ‘ought logically implies can’: we can propose logics in which it does, and logics
in which it does not.3 But we can consider whether a given ‘intuitive’ understanding
of the relationship between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ can in principle be formulated as an
entailment relationship in some logic. Such a formalisation can be helpful in refining our
intuitions, and in determining whether they can be given a consistent interpretation.
To exemplify this, it may be helpful to review how OIC may formulated in some
versions of von Wright’s deontic logic (von Wright :963, :968, :983b; Feis m.s.), some-
times known as Standard Deontic Logic.4 This provides a concrete illustration of some
of the issues that arise, and need to be considered, in an account of OIC. Here we are
not necessarily advocating the approach suggested by this version of deontic logic. It is
just that this is one case where a rigorous interpretation of OIC has been given (even if
we may dispute the details). As such, it acts as a guide as to some of the issues that arise
2For a reconstruction of the criticisms and some replies, see Vranas (2007).
3We can also propose logical formalisations of obligations in which the status of OIC is undecided or
contingent.
4Although OIC itself is not usually considered an essential feature of Standard Deontic Logic.
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when considering how OIC might be incorporated into existing legal theory, not just
an abstract, idealised logic.5
In deontic logic, one formulation of OIC is Op→ ♦p.6 Here, the obligation is ‘Op’,
where ‘p’ is intended to denote the propositional content of what is expected to be done,
or brought about; ‘→’ is material implication, and ‘♦p’ is the claim that ‘p’ is possible.
This involves mixed modalities: we have both a deontic modality (O) and an alethic one
(♦).7
In a possible-worlds interpretation, an obligation ‘that p’ indicates that it is desirable
to act in a way that in some sense moves us to a world in which p holds, or to ensure
we remain in a world in which p holds. And ‘♦p’ is the claim that there is such a world.
One question might be whether the relevant notion of accessibility for ♦ is the same as
that for O. If they can differ, then while p might be alethically possible, that does not
mean it is actually achievable. We might also wonder whether material implication is
appropriate here, or whether some kind of defeasible or pragmatic conditional would be
more appropriate.
In formal logic, axioms like Op→ ♦p are intended to be interpreted schematically.
In this case, for every proposition p in the theory, the axiom effectively says we need
to add the proposition Op → ♦p. There is a sense in which such schematic axioms
can be thought of as external constraints on theories expressed in a given logic; they
express formal requirements with which any reasonable theory is expected to comply.
Any deontic theory or system which fails to comply with this requirement will be
demonstrably inconsistent when formalised in a logic that includes this axiom.8
Assuming that we desire to avoid inconsistency, an axiom of a logic can be thought
of as imposing an obligation on any theory that is formulated in that logic—akin to
‘O’(Op→ ♦p), where ‘O’ is effectively a form of meta-level obligation (on the logician).
The ‘sanction’ for failing to comply with this ‘obligation’ is that the logic will be
inconsistent. But such an obligation is not an obligation of a theory formulated in
deontic logic; rather it in effect imposes a requirement on any system of obligations
formulated within the given logic. When it comes to the logician formalising a deontic
theory, the existence of such an axiom can be seen as imposing a meta-level constraint
or obligation on formal theories expressed within the logic (and as such, a constraint on
the logician), rather than being a norm of theories formulated in the logic.
While the notation Op → ♦p appears to make things precise, its meaning is still
contingent on the precise interpretation that we give to the constituent terms.9 We can
5This can be seen to be consistent with the advice of Żełaniec (20:5) to bring deontic logic into real (legal)
life. See his essay for more details on how technicalities of deontic modal logic, such as the K principle,
lead the deontic logician astray.
6This can be added as an axiom of Standard Deontic Logic with alethic modality. In the case of the
so-called Andersonian–Kangerian reduction of Standard Deontic Logic (Anderson :959; Kanger :97:),
Op→ ♦p is a theorem.
7Such formulas were considered problematic in the early days of deontic logic. For example, von Wright
(:95:) denied that such mixed expressions were well-formed formulas of denotic logic.
8As with all such axioms, we can turn the schematic notion of substitution into an explicit quantification
by giving a logical formalisation of the meta-theory, so we would then have ∀p ∈ Prop · (Op → ♦p),
where Prop stands for the class of propositions of the original logic, and p is a variable that ranges over
these propositions. This can be expressed in higher-order modal logic, or any logic with an appropriate
system of types (e.g. see Turner 2005).
9One constraint that Op → ♦p does impose, given any standard possible-worlds interpretation of
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argue about whether Standard Deontic Logic and its possible-worlds models are the most
appropriate framework in which to express theories of obligations and permissions, and
whether such formalisations are sympathetic to our intuitions (Fox 20:2a; Żełaniec 20:5).
In particular, there are some potential issues in interpreting ‘can’ as alethic possibility
♦, given that it does not take into account questions of agency. And the existence of
contrary-to-duty obligations:0 raises the question as to whether this logical formulation
is sympathetic to the nuances of obligations and their fulfilment. We could also argue
that the Standard Deontic Logic axiom for OIC might be too strict (cf. Fox 20:2a;
Martin 2009; Żełaniec 20:5).
Despite its various potential shortcomings, the formalisation of OIC as Op→ ♦p
in some form of Standard Deontic Logic provides a useful example of some of the key
issues to consider when it comes to normative systems: assuming we accept some version
of OIC, what do we intend it to mean; how do we best capture that meaning; and who,
or what, is required to ensure that OIC is fulfilled?
Before proposing a taxonomy of OIC theses (§2.4), we first review some other issues
relating to the analysis of OIC, and whether it is better considered as a presupposition
or as an implicature, rather than an axiomatic material implication.
2.2.2. Presuppositions
We take presuppositions to be those things that must be assumed to be true in order
for a statement to make sense (or at least, for the statement to be considered true).
We may wonder whether presuppositions are an appropriate way of characterising
the relationship between ‘ought p’ and ‘can p’. The answer to this question depends
on how we characterise presuppositions and which, if any, of those characterisations
may accord with our intuitions about OIC. If ‘ought p’ presupposes ‘can p’ on the
Russellian analysis, then in the event that ‘cannot p’ holds, ‘ought p’ must be false. On
a Strawsonian analysis of such a presupposition, if ‘cannot p’ holds, then ‘ought p’ is
infelicitous.::
But there are confounding factors. First there is the issue of presupposition accom-
modation (Heim :983; Thomason :990). Accommodation is where, in some sense, we
give the benefit of the doubt, and for the purposes of analysing meaning or engaging in
coherent discourse, we treat the presupposition as if it were true (without necessarily
committing ourselves to its truth). We might then accommodate ‘can p’ as a belief about
the beliefs of the agent who states ‘ought p’.
A second issue is that of ambiguity. Saying ‘ought p’ can impose an obligation,
describe an obligation, or describe a desirable state of affairs. The last case may be
characterised as ‘ought to be’, as opposed to ‘ought to do’. One possibility is that
deontic logic with alethic modality, is that the imposition of a logically impossible obligation leads to a
contradiction. For example, there can be no obligation (either stated or derived) of the form O(p ∧ ¬p).
:0Contrary-to-duty obligations are those obligations that apply when some other obligation has not been
fulfilled: ‘you are obliged to keep your promises. If you cannot keep your promises, you are obliged to
apologise.’ (cf. Chisholm :963).
::While not central to our concerns here, we note that it is possible to formalise a notion of ‘infelicity’,
given an appropriate theory of propositions, where only sentences judged to be felicitous (in this case,
only sentences whose presuppositions are satisfied) can play a role in truth-conditional inference (Fox
:994, 2000).
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we might use presupposition failure as a diagnostic for distinguishing between ‘ought
to do’ and ‘ought to be’—or at least to motivate a charitable (re)interpretation of an
impossible obligation as an optative statement: if ‘ought p’ is claimed, and ‘can p’ is false
(or taken to be false), and there are no grounds for revising this view, then the charitable
interpretation is that this can only be interpreted as ‘ought to be p’. This perhaps ties in
with the notion of an implicature.
2.2.3. Implicatures
Implicatures in the Gricean sense (Grice :975, :98:) can be characterised as the meaning
that an individual appears to convey by using a particular linguistic expression, in con-
trast to the overt semantic content of the expression.:2 Normative rules, or ‘maxims’, can
be formulated that seek to characterise implicatures and the relationship between what
is said and what is implicated. What is often taken to be distinctive about implicatures,
in contrast to entailment and presupposition, is they are cancellable (or defeasible).:3
In the case of ‘ought p’ and ‘can p’, Sinnott-Armstrong (:984) appears to build an
argument in favour of an implicature relationship (‘can p’ is an implicature of ‘ought
p’) on the basis that implicatures are cancellable. This is perhaps a different kind of
implicature to that of Grice. If the argument is that the implication between ‘ought p’
and ‘can p’ should be cancellable, or defeasible, that does not necessarily mean that it is
an implicature as such (at least in the Gricean sense).
If we follow Streumer (2003), we can resolve the problem that Sinnott-Armstrong
identifies in his examples by distinguishing ‘ought to do’ from ‘ought to have done’
(and from ‘ought to be/have been’). The maxim ‘ought implies can’ then becomes
‘ought-to-do p implies can-do p’ and ‘ought-to-have-done p implies could-have-done p’.
If we take into account the notion of presupposition, accommodation, and ambiguity,
this is not inconsistent with an analysis of OIC as ‘ought presupposes can’. And as
alluded to above (§2.2.2), a failure in the presupposition can either be attributed to a
misapprehension, or indicate that ‘ought’ should be given an optative interpretation,
‘ought to be’. For example, as a norm that governs individuals, ‘we ought to put a stop to
starvation in the world’ is something that lies beyond any individual’s financial, physical,
or political abilities. Thus, assuming some form of inference to the best explanation,
this might be interpreted as an optative corresponding to ‘It would be desirable for there
to be no starvation in the world’.:4
There remains the question of what is actually meant by ‘can’. In particular, in this
context we may wonder whether ‘can’ in OIC is to be interpreted as taking into account
what is permitted or at odds with other obligations (cf. Gilabert 2009; Lawford-Smith
20:0), or indeed whether it is ambiguous. Consider the simple case of an individual
:2For example, the sentence ‘I’m going home’, when uttered in response to the question ‘Are you coming
for a drink?’ is taken to implicate the answer ‘No (I am not coming for a drink)’.
:3By itself, the cancellability of implicatures need not be a bar to their formalisation within a logical
framework. Perhaps a larger obstacle is that conversational maxims often compete with each other; for
example we need to be informative, while avoiding verbosity. Arguably this may be better conceived of
as an optimisation problem. Following Horn (2004) this could be viewed as a competition between ‘Say
as much as you can’ and ‘Say no more than you must’.
:4By stating desirable goals, optative expressions may still guide individual and collective behaviour but an
argument can be made that this is still different in kind to an individual obligations that must be satisfied
in order to avoid some form of direct legal, contractual, or social sanction.
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obligation O(p). If we accept some version of the OIC principle, then this obligation
appears to presume that p is possible. But if there is also an obligation O(¬p), then the
question is whether that means that p should be considered to be no longer possible
in the sense that might be intended by OIC. Taking this further, there may be an
interpretation of OIC that gives it a key role in the analysis of conflicting obligations.
2.3. Kinds of norms
In addition to the issues raised above about the most appropriate approach for analysing
OIC, there remain questions about the nature of OIC, and whether it should be given
the same status as other norms. As an axiom or theorem of deontic logic, its formal
status will be different from that of obligations expressed within the logic. Here we
explore the different kinds of status that norms, and OIC in particular, could have.:5
2.3.:. Meta-, higher-order, primary, and secondary norms
It is appropriate to consider some of the different terminology that has been applied
in various discussions of norms and their formalisation. If we consider OIC to express
the expectation that it should be possible to comply with anything considered to be an
obligation, then this can be taken to be a claim, or expectation, about all obligations.
That is, we may consider it to be an expectation, or norm, that governs, or ranges over,
other obligations.
There is some subtlety about the terminology here, which may also depend on
precisely how a requirement such as OIC is formulated. When it comes to logical
formalisations such as that given in §2.2.:, we can view the axiom schema as embodying
meta-level requirements on the theory. The inclusion of OIC as an axiom is akin to
giving it a meta-level requirement, with the harsh punishment of formal inconsistency
in the event of a transgression.
We could also consider OIC itself to be a norm, perhaps expressed as an explicit
obligation or property governing other norms, but outside the given normative frame-
work (as already illustrated in §2.2.:). It may itself then be considered to be part of
another, larger normative framework, such as one that expresses what is expected when
one of the underlying norms is broken (cf. Axelrod :986) or that guides the law-maker
(von Wright :983b).:6
If we wished to treat OIC explicitly as an obligation itself, within the same theory
as the obligations that it governs, then we could consider formulating it as an iterated
obligation O(Op → ♦p).:7 Such cases of nested deontic operators, such as OOp, or
:5The notion of a ‘norm’ is a complex one (e.g. see Conte 2007). We do not attempt to resolve all
questions about what kinds of norms are relevant to the various characterisations of OIC.
:6von Wright’s views on OIC are not straightforward; one can find three different takes on the subject in
his writing (von Wright :963, :968, :983b). On this, see Feis (m.s.).
:7Which as a statement in second-order logic could be written as O(∀p ·Op→ ♦p) or ∀p ·O(Op→ ♦p).
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OPOp, are called ‘higher-order norms’:8 by von Wright and others.:9
It is tempting to consider simple obligations, of the form Op, as primary norms and
obligations about obligations, perhaps including OIC, as secondary norms. Unfortunately
these terms have already been claimed; indeed different authors already use these terms
in different ways.
For Kelsen (§3.2) the primary norms are those that characterise sanctions, such as
‘murderers shall be punished by life imprisonment’. And the secondary norms are those
that tell us how to behave in order not to incur the sanction, in this case ‘you ought not
to murder’. In both cases a formal translation into the language of deontic logic would
require only one deontic operator.
In contrast, Hart (§3.:) takes those norms that characterise the behaviour required to
avoid sanctions to be primary norms. Hart’s secondary norms are norms that perform
a precise function within a given legal framework—sometimes it is said that secondary
rules ‘confer powers’. As with Kelsen, both of these primary and secondary norms,
when translated into deontic logic, would require only a single, non-iterated, deontic
operator.20
Regardless of difference in terminology and formulation, it seem clear that OIC is
not a primary norm, given that it is a norm about norms. What is perhaps less obvious
is how it might best be interpreted more formally, whether it is an iterated norm—or
rule—within a theory, or some kind of meta-rule that is about a theory. And with
either analysis, there are questions as to how obligations, implication, and ‘can’ are to be
interpreted. But here we are particularly interested in how OIC itself can figure in the
law. This in turn might shed light on other questions around the OIC hypothesis.2:
Given all the various ways in which the general idea of OIC might be formulated
and characterised, and the various ways in which its status as a putative constraint or
expectation might be cashed out, it is difficult to come up with a neutral term that
describes such a status.22
:8This use of the term is not to be confused with the now more common logical notion of ‘higher order’
as applied to typed logic. In general the term ‘higher-order logics’ refers to logics with a system of types
that include propositions, individuals, and function types, and where quantification can range over
expressions of a given type. There is some potential for confusion here, as we can re-express axioms
for OIC as statements within higher-order logic. Specifically the axiom Op → ♦p can be written as
something like ∀p ·Op → ♦p if we allow quantification over propositions (cf. fn. 8). And what von
Wright refers to as ‘higher-order norms’ can themselves be expressed in higher-order logic. For example
O(Op→ ♦p) could be expressed as something along the lines of O(∀p ·Op→ ♦p) or ∀p ·O(Op→ ♦p)
(cf. Fox 20:2b;Żełaniec 20:5).
:9While von Wright initially rejected iterated deontic modalities (von Wright :95:), he later considered
them as well formed formulae of deontic logic (e.g. in von Wright :968, :983a).
20The regulative rules and constitutive rules of Searle (:969) complicate the picture even more. The former
regulate behaviour (cf. Kelsen’s secondary rules and Hart’s primary rules); the latter create new forms
of behaviour (see Bilmes :986). But again neither notion requires the iteration of deontic operators. In
the case of constitutive rules, Grossi and others have proposed a formal analysis expressed in terms of a
Counts-As operator (e.g. Grossi 20::), in the spirit of Searle.
2:Looking ahead to §2.4, this distinction between iterated norms and meta-norms applies both to the OIC-
nature family and to the OIC-use family. In the first case, the Foundational OIC is iterated, whereas OIC
as a (Conversational) Maxim seems to constitute a meta-norm. Both OIC as a Principle of Normative
Consistency and the (Meta)ethical OIC seem to be meta-norms, whereas the Legislative OIC is an
iterated norm.
22In order to provide a relatively neutral characterisation of OIC, we will suggest that it be viewed as
having some ‘structural’ or ‘architectural’ role.
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2.3.2. Pragmatic versus semantics norms
We have already discussed semantic and pragmatic inference in relation to OIC (§2.2).
Here we consider this distinction from the perspective of legal systems.
In the case of a logical formalisation of legal systems, it would be preferable to avoid
a logical collapse in the event that some obligations are individually or collectively
unfulfillable (Fox 2009, 20:2a; Lawford-Smith 20:2). Given the fallibility of legislative
drafters, this suggests that it may be preferable to give OIC some form of pragmatic
interpretation. But the nature of such would need to be spelt out in any given case. The
nature of any implicit notion of OIC might also change according to what is at stake:
for someone drafting legislation it may act as a guide to drafting reasonable law. For
someone enforcing the law, it might act as a guide for mitigation or reinterpretation.
In general, the principle of OIC may identify cases where the coherence of a given
legal code may be in question (and hence whether it embodies achievable expectations).
This might include the logical impossibility of satisfying conflicting obligations. In such
cases there are legal questions that need to be taken into account. There may even be
a body of ‘compensating’, or ‘contrary-to-duty’ obligations that prescribe how such
matters are to be dealt with.23 Given these issues, it would appear that OIC may have
a pragmatic role (in some very general sense of ‘pragmatic’). With various legal and,
potentially, moral nuances, such a role is not easily reduced to self-contained formal
notions. But a case can be made for treating OIC as an implicature of some kind, in
particular an implicature that we act to maintain rather than allow to be easily overruled
(cf. §:).
2.4. A taxonomy of OIC theses
The various claims about the role of OIC can be seen to fall into different categories.
Some are concerned with the nature of OIC, and others with its application or use. Still
others fall into a methodological category. This last category seems to be a tertium datur
between the other two families: it tells us how to argue for a given OIC thesis (which
can characterise both what OIC is and how OIC is to be applied). We might characterise
this last category as being concerned with justification.
Here we offer a tentative classification of eight different theses into these three
categories. There may be some overlap between these categories, depending on one’s
views of the individual theses about OIC and the distinction between nature, use, and
justification. Of the following eight theses concerning OIC, some are stated explicitly
in the literature on OIC itself and on the question of how to frame research on OIC;
others are implicit.
As a broad approximation, theses concerned with the nature of OIC are related
to issues about the general underlying semantic vs. pragmatic characterisation of OIC
(§2.2). Those concerned with the application of OIC can be seen to relate, at a very
general level, to the various proposals on OIC and the law (§3). And the methodological
theses relate to those cases where we might consider OIC to be a guiding principle, as
with Hart’s rules of Change and Recognition (§3.:).
23There is an extensive literature relating to the various issues and controversies that arise when formalising
contrary-to-duty obligations (see e.g. Chisholm :963; Castañeda :98:; Fox 20:2a).
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2.4.:. Theses on the nature of OIC
We can discern the following four kinds of claims that seem concerned primarily with
the nature of OIC. The names are intended to be indicative of their general flavour.
:. Truth-conditional OIC: it is a truth of logic due to the semantics of deontic terms
that OIC holds for norms and commands (Hare :963; von Wright :963).
2. Ethical OIC: OIC is an ethical truth whereby it is unfair to order what is impossible
(Copp 2008, and perhaps Carter 200:).
3. Foundational OIC: OIC-related claims are different in kind to regular norms and
are perhaps best conceived of as corresponding to, or a consequence of, something
like a higher-order or iterated norm of the form ‘it ought to be the case that OIC’ (cf.
Fox 20:2b).
4. OIC as a (Conversational) Maxim: OIC is a Gricean maxim that we use to issue
commands (§2.2). As we have seen (§2.2.3), Sinnott-Armstrong (:984) puts forward
what might be described as a pragmatic version of OIC (though criticised by Streumer
[2003]).24
2.4.2. Theses on the application of OIC
We can identify the following three general theses that can be described as related
primarily to the use of OIC.
5. OIC as a Principle of Normative Consistency: OIC is needed to achieve some form
of consistency in a legal system or a system of norms. Arguably this presumes a
particular way of formulating norms and obligations, although this kind of thesis
may be no different to some of the others in this regard. For arguments that OIC is
equivalent to the principle of consistency of deontic logic, see for example Lemmon
(:962, :965); see Kading (:965) for criticisms of this view.25
6. (Meta) ethical OIC: OIC is needed to avoid unfair impossible requirements (Tranøy
:972, :975; Carter 200:). Carter (200:, 92) explicitly says that OIC is a second-order
ethical norm. Carter characterises OIC’s second-order nature as something less than
a metaethical thesis such as ‘moral principles are neither truth nor false’ but more
than a first-order ethical claim such as ‘you should not kill me’.26
24We think the characterisation of OIC as a (Conversational) Maxim is somewhat different: it may
be more appropriate to consider Sinnott-Armstrong’s (:984) account as a form of ‘presuppositional’
OIC (although that may be included within the scope of OIC as a (Conversational) Maxim). See also
Forrester (:989) for a pragmatic take on OIC.
25Dahl (:974) considers this view, taking into account the concept of excuses and justifications. Jacquette
(:99:) shows how OIC could result in a dilemma for deontic logic (see Slater [:994] for a reply).
26This is how Carter (200:, 8:) states his OIC as an ethical norm:
On this interpretation, we do not see [OIC] as simply holding for any prescriptive use of ‘ought’. Rather, we
see it as holding because we believe that its denial is wrong – because we think it ethically mistaken to prescribe
impossible things.
To his ethical OIC, Carter opposes the thesis that sees OIC as a semantic norm, as advocated by Hare
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7. Legislative OIC: OIC tells the norm-giver what to do if he wants to create a rational
legal system (von Wright :983b). This is perhaps related to OIC as a Principle of
Normative Consistency, except that it is directed overtly at the norm-giver.
2.4.3. Justification and OIC
We can identify the following thesis that is related to the justification of OIC and, in
general, the resolution of the different issues pertaining to OIC.
8. Methodological OIC: OIC is a thesis to be justified on methodological grounds but
is not a conceptual or logical truth. There are reasons to include it in a normative
system, but a system lacking OIC would not necessarily be contradictory. This
view can be identified in von Wright (:968).27 Also Forrester (:989) emphasises the
methodological question, and considers OIC to be more a desideratum.
3. OIC and Legal Philosophy
Having considered some general questions concerning how OIC may be analysed and
formalised, we now consider whether, and how, OIC may feature in the legal theories of
Hart and Kelsen. To this end, we consider each of these frameworks in turn, giving a
brief overview of them, and then reflect on where and how the OIC thesis might apply,
or at least be considered, within these two influential theories.28
For us, it seems that OIC plays what can be thought of as a ‘structural’ or ‘archi-
tectural’ role,29 by which we mean that OIC is placed in some ‘meta-’ position when
compared to the simplest example of norms that tell us what to do or what is permit-
ted—such as ‘do not steal’ or ‘you are allowed to turn left’. In contrast to simple norms
and obligations, OIC reflects something about other norms, or those issuing them,
regardless of precisely how such a ‘second-order’ status might be formulated (§2.3.:). We
can view OIC as a notion that can be used to shape, manage, or characterise a system of
norms. OIC need not be regarded as an explicit precondition for obligations but can
(:963, 59):
The impossibility, or the inevitability, of doing something stops the question of whether to do it arising.
According to Carter (200:) the function of this latter OIC is ‘to describe one of the semantic properties
of prescriptive ethical norms, thus filtering out some of the norms which cannot fall into this category’
(p. 80). Thus the semantic OIC can be used ‘to circumscribe our ethical prescriptions’ (p. 8:).
27‘A decision to accept the idea that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ must be motivated, it seems to me, from
consideration of an axiological order.’ (von Wright :968, 68).
28For a broader picture of Kelsen’s Pure Theory, see Kelsen (:934, :945, :960). The first two chapters of
Marmor (20:0) offer a presentation of the Kelsenian and Hartian frameworks, as do essays 3, 5, 7, and 8
of Raz (:979).
29The terms ‘structural’ and ‘architectural’ are intended to be suggestive of the various different ways in
which OIC may play a role in a system of norms. Other terms that may also seem appropriate—such
as ‘secondary’, ‘meta-’ or ‘higher-order’—run the risk of being conflated with related topics in the
philosophy of law. As an example, it is tempting to call OIC a ‘secondary’ norm, but as we shall see,
this term has already been co-opted. Given that in the context of legal norms, the word ‘secondary’
already has two existing, incompatible senses—as adopted by Kelsen and Hart, respectively—it would be
unhelpful to add a third.
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instead be viewed as having a role in evaluating the coherence of a system of rules, and
perhaps the rationality of the norm-giver.
First we consider the nature of OIC in relation to Hart’s conception of a secondary
norm (§3.:); then we consider OIC in relation to Kelsen’s distinction between primary
and secondary norms and his idea of a Basic Norm (§3.2). It is hoped that these
considerations will help provide a better understanding of the potential applications
of OIC and the ways it may feature in legal philosophy. In addition, legal philosophy
may help us to determine if OIC might be used in some (pragmatic) legal way—whether
during legal drafting or legal interpretation—that is distinct from its interpretation or
relevance in the context of everyday statements about obligations.
3.:. OIC and the Hartian framework
Hart (:96:) adopts what might now be considered the traditional view of the pri-
mary–secondary norms distinction: that law consists of duty-imposing primary norms,
while secondary norms confer power and add structure to the legal system, and —accord-
ing to Hart’s thought experiment—distinguish a working legal system from a primitive
legal system consisting only of primary norms. He argues that the distinction resides in
secondary norms that govern the recognition of the relevant laws, and procedures for
changing and for applying those laws. These are Hart’s rules of Recognition, Change and
Adjudication. We sketch these rules in turn—and then discuss how they may relate to
the interpretation of OIC.
:. Recognition: Hart’s Rules of Recognition determine which norms belong to a certain
legal system and which do not. They are Hart’s solution to the problem of the unity
of a legal system and the validity of its norms. In some key respects they play roles
similar to Kelsen’s Basic Norm (§3.2). Nonetheless, according to Hart, a rule of
recognition is something we can find in the world and recognise. We accept some
form of rule of recognition and persevere with it.30
2. Change: Hart’s Rules of Change prescribe how we can change a given legal system.
The rules for changing a legal code will differ depending on the legal system in
question.3:
3. Adjudication: Finally, Hart’s Rules of Adjudication are concerned with the appli-
cation of a legal system and how to deal with controversies. They are the rules (or
identify those rules) governing the organisation of tribunals, judges, and trials.
For each of Hart’s secondary rules we can ask how they relate to OIC. There is a
caveat for the rest of our analysis of OIC when interpreted along the lines of Hart’s
theory of secondary rules: all of Hart’s secondary rules of recognition, change, and
adjudication are empirical in nature (i.e. they are not presuppositional in nature, unlike
Kelsen’s Basic Norm). Our inquiry into OIC’s possible roles takes into account only the
30This idea of a Rule of Recognition is not without problems or controversy, but as before our main
objective here is not to provide a critical commentary on these accounts, but merely to identify in what
ways OIC might play a role in a given theory.
3:As with the rule of recognition, the rules of change are concerned with the validity of a legal system.
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function Hart is using rather than the empirical characterisation. The claim that some
form of OIC thesis could itself be empirical is not something we seek to defend here.32
3.:.:. OIC and the rules of recognition
Hart’s Rules of Recognition are the means by which those rules that belong to the legal
system are distinguished from those that do not. In our view, OIC could play a role in
recognition: if it were claimed that only norms that can be fulfilled may be part of the
legal system, then that would in effect be using OIC as one of the criteria that need to
be satisfied for a rule to be recognised as part of the legal system.
There are a number of ways in which such a result could be obtained: (:) We could
claim that OIC is an essential requirement that holds for all the norms, and use it as a
rule of recognition. (2) Another option is to say OIC is a pragmatic Gricean maxim
included in every act of norm issuing; this would be another way in which OIC could
have a role in recognising salient norms. (3) A third option to give OIC a role in
recognition would be to load it with some ethical import: either (a) consider OIC
as a truth of ethics that claims it is unfair and unjust to order the impossible, or (b)
claim OIC is ethically required to avoid impossible requirements. These two ethically
loaded options may also play a role in recognition: while they may allow an impossible
command to still be considered a command—unlike option (:)—they may suggest that,
ethically at least, such a command need not be followed, because of its ‘unfairness’.
(4) A final option is to say that OIC is a norm of rational law-making. In that way it is
addressed to law officials or the law-givers and when they follow a rule of recognition, it
allows them to determine which norms are part of the legal system.33
3.:.2. OIC and the rules of change
Concerning OIC and the Rules of Change — the rules that allow and govern the modifi-
cation of the legal system—it can be argued that the OIC thesis cannot play a direct role
when it comes to modifying a legal system, as it does not say how a modification should
be made. Prima facie it seems that the notion of ‘changing a rule’ as such is not able to
interact with the OIC thesis, unless we say that OIC has a role in recognising legitimate
rules (as in §3.:.: above).
Given the ‘recognition’ role that may be played by OIC, one may say that as a
guiding principle OIC can help prevent legal systems from issuing impossible norms.34
Even if OIC has this role of helping to specify what may count as a norm, the various
interpretations of OIC do not state how to change the law; they may instead play a role
in excluding, or at least identifying, certain problematic outcomes, or even recognising
cases where a change may be appropriate.
Saying that certain outcomes are to be avoided, or that certain systems of rules
are problematic and need to be changed, can both be construed as being related to the
32For an empirical study on OIC see Mizrahi (20:5).
33These different options correspond to the earlier classifications of OIC (§2.4) as follows: OIC can be
considered (:) a form of Truth-conditional OIC; (2) a (conversational) maxim; (3a) Ethical OIC; (3b) a
principle of normative consistency; or (4) Legislative OIC.
34Truth-conditional OIC—§2.4.: and option (:) of §3.:.: (OIC and the Rule of Recognition)—will prevent
them from being included in legal codes, and Ethical OIC—§2.4.: and option (3a) of §3.:.:— could be
used to say they are not obligatory norms in the event they were issued.
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rule of change. In this regard, the status of OIC in the context of the rule of change is
somewhat nuanced: it may depend on how we see the rules of recognition and rules of
change interacting.
3.:.3. OIC and the rules of adjudication
In the case of OIC and the Rules of Adjudication — the rules according to which legal
controversies can be solved—the situation is, perhaps, similar to that of the Rules of
Change (above, §3.:.2): the principle of OIC does not tell us how to adjudicate over
conflicting rules, but it may help identify the contributing sources of conflicts, either
between rules themselves or between the rules and external realities, perhaps as a result
of contingencies that were not contemplated when the law was drafted.
We might hope that OIC could identify which rules should be excluded when
resolving a dispute. But this requires some way of determining which rules should
remain and which should be excluded or moderated. By itself, OIC may not help resolve
such conflicts or provide any specific ‘OIC adjudication procedures’; it does not specify
what counts as an admissible proof, which legal institution has competence over a case,
whether testimonial proofs are admitted or not, and so on. It may instead merely help
to localise some of the issues that give rise to the conflict.
3.2. OIC and the Kelsenian framework
Kelsen (:934, :945, :960) was predominately interested in what he described as a ‘Pure
Theory’ of the law that avoided a reduction of the law to other, non-legal, notions (such
as justice or morality). Rather than evaluate the motivations and merits of this account,
here we have a specific interest in how the OIC thesis might be accommodated by some
of the technical aspects of his account, in particular his distinction between primary and
secondary norms and his notion of the Basic Norm of a legal system.
According to Kelsen, a legal system is composed of an hierarchical structure of
norms, and the leading characteristic of legal norms is that of being valid. He also
thought that a ‘lower level’ norm is valid because there is a norm above it that confers
validity on it. The problem is easily seen: how do we avoid an infinite regress? How can
we establish a source of validity?
Kelsen’s answer was that we have to presuppose a source that confers validity on
the whole system of norms. Kelsen called this norm the Basic Norm (Grundnorm in
German). He further characterised it as a set of characteristics and procedures that
enabled a norm to be valid in a given legal system. Thus we can regard the Basic Norm
as a constitution or as the procedure we use to make a valid law.
3.2.:. Kelsen’s primary and secondary norms
As in any other field, different views on the nature of the law can result in the adoption
of different terminology, or different uses for the same terminology. This applies to
the question of what counts as a primary obligation, rule, or norm: what counts as
secondary; and from whose perspective. For Kelsen, a primary norm is a the rule that
determines the sanction for some behaviour according to a certain legal system—for
example, ‘pay €50 if you smoke inside the university’. And a secondary norm is one
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that specifies what you have to avoid a sanction—in this case, ‘do not smoke inside the
university’.
This might now be considered non-standard terminology, or a non-standard perspec-
tive, when compared with the usual contemporary conventions whereby—in a legal
context at least—the desired behaviour is considered a primary norm, and secondary
norms are concerned with the application of the law (§2.3.:, Hart :96:). Some of the
difference in terminology may be attributed to there being a different perspective on
who is considered to be the target of the obligation.35
3.2.2. Basic norm
For Kelsen, the ‘Basic Norm’ (Grundnorm) is the norm that founds and give authority
to a given system of positive law. The Basic Norm of a legal system lays down the
conditions that the norms of a system must satisfy to be valid. By doing so, it grants the
system ‘unity’: only the norms that follow or comply with the basic norm (Grundnorm)
are valid in that legal system.
Different systems will have a different Basic Norm (for example, compare a positive
law system based on common law vs. a positive law system based on continental
constitutional law). Nonetheless, given one system of positive law there is only one
Basic Norm.
Kelsen’s adoption of the notion of a Basic Norm can be seen to follow from his belief
in the Is–Ought gap—that obligations cannot be derived from simple facts—meaning that
a system of law (or morals) cannot have a factual, empirical source of validity.36 In effect,
the Basic Norm can be seen as a hypothesis that Kelsen adopted to block the regressus ad
infinitum when attempting to trace back the source of validity or legitimacy of a legal
system that can have no empirical foundation. Clearly many arguments can be made
about the advantages and disadvantages of assuming a Basic Norm, and the role and
nature of any such norms and claims about them. But our primary concern here is the
question of whether, and how, consideration of OIC may feature in such an account.
We now consider the relationship between OIC and Kelsen’s primary–secondary
distinction and his Basic Norm.
3.2.3. OIC and the Kelsenian primary/secondary distinction
We need to consider the question of how OIC and its role might be interpreted in the
context of Kelsen’s distinction between primary and secondary norms. To address this,
we need to reflect on whether the Kelsenian distinction between primary and secondary
norms (§3.2.:)—that is, between the imputation of a sanction and stating the rule that
tells you what to do to avoid that sanction—is relevant for OIC.
We find it a little awkward to characterise OIC in these Kelsenian terms, but we
tentatively offer the following:
35Kelsen distinguished different kinds of normative system: (i) dynamic systems (e.g. positive law); and (ii)
static systems (e.g. systems of morals). In the latter, validity follows ‘analytically’ from the Basic Norm.
We ‘read in the content’ of ‘love thy neighbour’ that ‘do not steal’ may be deduced. Kelsen is aware that
real legal systems are somehow mixed between (i) and (ii), e.g. that morality affects the positive law.
36‘. . . the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived
by reason’ (Hume :739, 335).
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:. OIC as a Kelsenian primary norm: A norm that requires something impossible is not
valid.
2. OIC as a Kelsenian secondary norm: The legislator should not issue norms that demand
the impossible.
This merits some discussion. The idea of taking OIC to be a Kelsenian primary norm
seems a little strange. It would appear to treat ‘not being valid’ as akin to some form
of sanction (a controversial thesis, see Mullock :974 and Bulygin :992); thus we would
then be using OIC to ascribe sanctions. Still, these sanctions are quite peculiar as they
primarily sanction norms rather than agents: compare ‘do not smoke (or you’ll be fined)’
and ‘do not pass impossible norms (or they will be invalid and you will be sanctioned as
a bad legislator)’. In effect, the target of this latter primary OIC is not behaviour as such
but the norms themselves. Thus, when considering the Kelsenian primary aspects of
this OIC, we are in secondary territory from Hart’s perspective, that is, that of ‘norms
for norms’, or meta-norms.
As a secondary Kelsenian norm, OIC here is interpreted as something that applies
to the law-givers. The case can be made that it is only the law-giver (and those issuing
commands) whose behaviour we might expect to be governed by a requirement to
consider OIC. In order to do their job of being rational law-givers and avoid sanction for
producing a null and void norm (because of the sanction carried by OIC as a primary
norm), they have to issue norms that ‘pass the OIC test’.
3.2.4. OIC and Kelsen’s Basic Norm
We now compare OIC, and its potential role, with the function of the Basic Norm
in Kelsen’s theory. Kelsen’s Basic Norm (§3.2.2) appears to play a ‘structural’ or
‘architectural’ role. And we have already seen that there might be room for a similar
foundational role for OIC, especially if we considered it a rule addressed to law-givers. So
should OIC be taken to constitute part of such a foundational norm from the Kelsenian
perspective?
While it can be argued that OIC is a prerequisite or a presupposition of a (fair) legal
system—a feature that OIC shares with the Basic Norm—it is also the case that it is rare
to find a legal system that positively and explicitly lays down OIC as an article of a civil
or penal code (one of the possible exceptions being the Justinian Digesta, which features
impossibilium nulla obligatio). But analogies are not enough; even though the use of OIC
as a presupposition of legislation shares some features of the Basic Norm, OIC cannot
really be considered to form part of the Basic Norm, at least not in the sense that Kelsen
intends. To see why, remember that Kelsen’s theory was a Pure Theory. He wanted to
avoid talking about justice or moral practices in giving the formal structure of a legal
system (Kelsen :957); using OIC with reference to fairness and justice as a Basic Norm
would seem to violate the Kelsenian positivistic stance.
There is an option to frame OIC as a rational principle rather than a moral one,
which might make it easier to accept within the Kelsenian theory. Still, one would need
to see the details of this and ensure that it does not aim directly at optimising good,
welfare, justice or other elements that Kelsen wanted to exclude.
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4. Conclusions
A key objective of this paper has been to review the ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) hypothesis,
and the various ways in which the hypothesis might apply in theories of the law.
We outlined different ways of relating ‘ought’ to ‘can’ (§2.2), distinguishing implica-
ture, presupposition, and entailment. This provides some perspective on how we might
interpret OIC, in particular by finding an appropriate characterisation of what ‘imply’
means. This also has the potential to provide insight into the relevant applications of
OIC. But the mere use of logic or related formal methods does not by itself answer any
questions about what OIC means or when it should be applied. Rather, it provides tools
that may help us to characterise and refine our intuitions about what it means—intuitions
that include our understanding of how OIC may serve as a norm in some contexts, such
as in the domain of legal reasoning.
There is a question about the status of OIC, and what kind of norm it could be
(§2.3), such as a meta-norm or some form of iterated modality. We take it that, at the
least, OIC has what can be described as a ‘structural’ or ‘architectural’ nature. We have
proposed a taxonomy for the OIC thesis that reflects the various roles OIC may be
taken to play (§2.4). We suggest that this provides a framework in which to describe
and compare different approaches to the question of what OIC is, how it can be applied,
and how it can be analysed. Finally, we considered the potential status of OIC in the
context of Hartian theory and Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (§3).
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